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ABSTRACT  
Cloud computing offers various services which are analogous to traditional data centers. 
The on demand supply of resources make this model of utility computing as the platform 
for many web based services. However security is always a major concern. This thesis 
proposes a new architecture called Self-service cloud computing with virtual shield (VS) 
to secure the entire cloud environment. Virtual shield (VS) is designed with the 
reinforcement learning mechanism to dynamically change the configurations of the client 
virtual machines (VM) in case of an attack to achieve the required security. This work 
introduces a novel way to measure the security of the system based on attack surface. The 
configurations scores generated during the learning process determines the activity of the 
client. The dynamic configuration of virtual machines in-case of an attack, reduces the 
attack surface and secures the cloud VM’s. 
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1.1 OVERVIEW  
 
Cloud computing is a novel architecture in the field of information technology. Cloud computing 
offers various services which are analogous to traditional data centers. Software as a service 
(SAAS), Infrastructure as a service (IAAS), Application as a service (AAAS), Platform as a 
service (PAAS) promotes cloud computing to various organizations [7]. Cloud computing 
provides location independent services to the user. Resource allocation, data management, load 
balancing is under the control of cloud service providers. However, security is always a major 
concern in cyber cloud technology. The principles, methodologies, and tools for secure cloud 
computing are yet to be developed. Various cloud security systems such as advanced cloud 
systems (ASP) through secure virtualization [8], cloud protector through cloud trace back 
mechanism [10], hierarchical attribute encryption [11] have been proposed to enhance security in 
the cloud environment. However, these mechanisms degrade the performance of the system and 
counter only known attacks. 
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A novel architecture called self-service cloud computing [1] has been introduced to resolve most 
of the issues faced by guest virtual machines. However this system is less concerned about the 
security of the host operating system since most of the privileges exists within the guest Meta 
domain created. Moreover there is no standard way of measuring the cloud system with respect to 
security. This work introduces a way to measure the security of the system through an attack 
surface. This paper also introduces an extension to self-service cloud computing [1] to 
dynamically configure the privileges between the host operating system and guest virtual 
machines in SSC (Self Service Cloud Computing).This protects the host operating system from 
the guest virtual machines. 
 
1.2 SELF SERVICE CLOUD WITH VIRTUAL SHIELD 
Self-service cloud computing is a service oriented architecture which mitigated security and 
privacy issues related to client virtual machines. Inflexible control, which requires the cloud 
providers to define the security measurements like VMware introspection, migration and check 
pointing are handed over to client’s Meta domain in the SSC. The Hypervisor and hardware are 
assumed to be a TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE since they are provided by trusted 
organizations in this architecture. In self-service cloud computing the host operating system has 
no privileges to view the guests virtual CPU, memory or the configuration parameters of the Meta 
domain. The operating system acts to initiate the boot up process and hold the privileges to shut 
down the virtual machines. Though this architecture provides a MUTUALLY TRUSTED 
SERVICE DOMAINS (MTSDs) which is a regulatory compliance between cloud providers and 




This research focuses on shifting the privileges between the host operating system and guest 
virtual machines. A Virtual Shield (VS) is introduced to act according to the information 
provided by the MTSDs. The Virtual shield is a virtual machine designed to dynamically 
configure the guest virtual machines with the help of a reinforcement learning algorithm. 
 
1.3 ATTACK SURFACE IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
In cloud computing there is no standard way to measure the security of the system. The Attack 
surface is one way to measure the security of the system. A system with a larger attack surface is 
more vulnerable to attacks and vice versa. Secure cloud computing needs a practical software 
metrics and measurements [2]. The Attack surface in cloud computing can be categorized into 6 
different categories based on the systems involved in the communication [2]. Our work 
introduces an IO automation model for the attack surface of self-service cloud computing with 
reinforcement learning and compares this model with a self-service attack surface. 
 
1.4 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING  
Reinforcement learning method is used to make the virtual shield introduced in the new 
architecture to learn from the environment. This learning in turn facilitates the configuration of 
the host and guest virtual machines dynamically. The shifting of privileges reduces the attack 






1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Guest operating systems misuse the cloud infrastructure for malicious activities. At the moment, 
there is no way to identify the attacks because most of the privileges exist within the Meta 
domain of the guest. This increases the attack surface and results in various attacks on the host 
virtual machine and hypervisor. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The main objective is to reduce the attack surface of self-surface cloud computing by introducing 
a virtual shield in the system. The virtual shield has the capability to learn from the environment 
and dynamically configure the host and guest operating systems. This learning is based on the 
reinforcement learning methodology.  
 
1.7 OUTLINE  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the review of literature, Chapter 
3 presents the proposed work, and Chapter 4 covers the simulations and results. Finally Chapter 5 








Cloud computing refers to computing over the internet where dynamically scaled shared 
resources (mostly virtual) are provided as a service by using virtualization platforms. Cloud 
Architecture is based on virtualization of the resources. Below is the basic cloud architecture [7]. 
 
 
                                                        Figure 2.1 Basic Cloud Frameworks 
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Cloud computing utilizes a service oriented architecture to utilize the services of cloud. There are 
different types of virtualizations that are used in cloud computing such as Storage, Network and 
server virtualization [8] which yields a different set of security concerns for each type of 
virtualization technique used. 
 
2.1 SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
The client or user is unaware of which physical system the process is actually running on and 
where the data is stored. If a malicious user is from same Physical system he can get the data 
from the physical system. This is because VM’s (Virtual Machines) map the data on storage 
provided logically but all the data resides physically on single storage. Data centers are located 
across the globe. User should be able to define where his data and process should reside because 
each country has different security policies. 
We need to have a different security levels in the cloud architecture which reduces the amount of 
risks because of the above problems and it should be cost effective. Different data centers have 
different security policies and different VM’s run on different zones of security leading to loss of 
policies and increased security concerns. Because all these VM’s from different security zones 
communicate with each other on a Virtual Network. Any weak link will pose a severe threat to 
whole application [9]. 
Since the cloud uses virtualization, it needs to keep up to date with the latest patches for all the 
virtual machines which is very difficult to manage.  Security configuration management is a 
serious problem and administrators have to keep track of each VM and all the security policies 
related to data and localization. The Cloud uses different service models such as Saas, Paas, Daas, 




Virtualization introduces many more problems into the cloud [8]. Using Virtualization we 
introduce many new OS types over which the applications are run. These new OS’s are a security 
concern. Different virtual OS’s have different security mechanisms. If one of the new OS is 
attacked then the attacker will try to get access to the underlying physical host.  This means it will 
affect the security of all other virtual machines running on this physical host. 
The VM’s communicate with each other over the network which opens avenues for the Guest to 
guest attack where one virtual machine tries to attack the other virtual machines. Moreover it is 
difficult to keep track of the VM’s. In this scenario two VM’s communicate with each other over 
a network. VM1 can get information regarding VM2 by sending queries while communicating. 
VM1 might be an intruder or a malicious user. Since it’s difficult to keep track of VM’s it’s 
difficult to determine who the malicious user is and what information has been compromised.  
Hyper jacking is one other attack where a malicious user will run a thin Hypervisor (a rootkit) on 
the physical system by which he will get root level access of the whole Operating system. 
Example is a Blue pill [9]. This lies between the Host OS and VM’s. It allocates resources to the 
Guest OS. Regular security measures are ineffective with this kind of attack because the original 
OS will be compromised with this. Security between the Host and VM is another important area 
which introduces a threat called VM escape [9]. There are different zones in the cloud and even if 
a single VM is attacked it poses a threat to the whole system. Using any of these attacking 
techniques and other possible ways of attacking, if a malicious user can get access to a VM then 
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Figure 2.2 Attacks on Hypervisor and Virtual Machines 
 
In order to avoid VM escape all the VM’s should be well identified and managed. Different types 
of cloud are the most important targets where there will be many security concerns [9]. These 
different types of clouds include private clouds, public clouds and hybrid which pose a serious 
threat when VM’s from these individual clouds communicate with each other [4]. A Private cloud 
by itself might be more secure but when it joins with the public cloud to form a Hybrid cloud 




Figure 2.3 Hybrid Cloud 
 
The virtual network should be protected along with the physical network because both of them 
are independent on their own [8]. Virtual network traffic is highly invisible due to virtualization. 
This may lead to attacks on the physical network and vice-versa. 
VM1 VM3 VM-n VM2 
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Host Operating System 











                                 Figure 2.4 Attacks on Virtual Network and Physical Network 
Figure 2.4 Virtual Network and Private Network 
 
Although the network of VM’s and actual physical machines are independent, any security threat 
to either of these will result in security concerns which may be data loss, resource wastage, 
flooding and loss of data integrity. 
All the services (Saas, Paas, IaaS, Security as a Service, DaaS, NaaS) [7] are offered using web 
services or Web browsers. Hence VM security alone is not enough.  Using these web services 
users will get access to the VM’s on which these services run. So we need to secure the way users 
communicate with these VMs. We need to have trust when a user uses an application developed 
on the cloud. A different user in another VM from the cloud can communicate with the 
application running on the Cloud. Hence we need to have trust between the users in the cloud 





Virtual Network Security 











Figure 2.5 Trusts between Users 
Interactive virtualization relates risks say communication between the virtualized network and 
virtualized server. Any security concerns will multiply the number of threats. Furthermore, VM 
deployment and VM data backup needs to be more secure. 
The dynamic and elastic nature of cloud introduces new threat [7]. When new resources are added 
to the existing cloud they must be compatible with existing security policies before use. This 
introduces dynamic security assignment before use. 
The proposed work is related to self-service cloud computing [1]. The self-service cloud 
computing architecture is modified to enhance the security and reduce the attack surface of the 
system. Attack surface is used as a measurement to compare different cloud architectures. To 
enhance the security of the cloud system, reinforcement learning methods can be used. 
Furthermore the virtual shield can be configured with different security metrics to defend against 




                                              
 










2.2 SELF SERVICE CLOUD COMPUTING 
Self-service cloud computing is a computing model that that resolves two shortcomings in the 
traditional cloud architecture. Virtualization is the key to any cloud architecture [7]. Virtual 
machine monitors are used in many cloud architectures to administer and execute client virtual 
machines. These virtual machine monitors comprises of a Hypervisor, Hardware and a host 
virtual machine called dom0. The hypervisor and hardware are assumed to be a trusted computing 
base whereas the dom0 is considered to be the source of different attacks. Since most of the 
privileges lies within dom0 there is a high risk of utilizing this administrative domain for 
malicious activities. 
 
The two major problems in the traditional cloud computing are 
 Security and privacy of the client virtual machine 
The state of the client virtual machine can be inspected by dom0. It holds the privileges 
to inspect the contents of the client VMs and their configurations. The client virtual 
machines security and privacy can be compromised due to various attacks by the host 
virtual machine’s (Dom0). Misconfiguration and malicious system administrators can be 
the source of attacks. 
 Inflexible control over the client VMs 
Virtualization facilitates different services to the client. It has the potential to enable 
services like, migration, check pointing and VM introspection [1]. However the 
deployment of these services in the present cloud architecture is under the control of 
cloud infrastructure providers. The client virtual machines have no control over the 
adoption of these services. Upon the request of the Client, the virtual machines are 
12 
 
configured with these services. However, these services won’t fit for all the clients. A 
few client VMs may use encryption to securely transfer data packets, but the service that 
checks the malicious content using signatures may not be able to use the encryption 
mechanism. The client virtual machines may need different security mechanisms for 
different kinds of attacks. Thus the present cloud architecture has inflexible control over 
the client VMs. 
 
Figure 2.6 Self Service Cloud Computing 
 
 Self-service cloud computing addresses these two shortcomings by assigning more privileges to 
client virtual machines. The protocol is designed to protect the client virtual machines from 
malicious system administrators and to provide control of the services required by the client. The 
SSC (Self-service cloud computing) divides the entire system into two TCBs (Trusted 
COMPUTING BASE). The system consists of the system level TCB, with the hardware, the SSC 




UDom0 is the client side per user administrative domain that can monitor and control the set of 
VMs of a particular client. This virtual machine attempts to start a VM in SSC. It also has the 
privileges to perform system services on the client virtual machines. 
UDomUs are the actual client side virtual machines with the guest operating systems. 
SDs (Service Domains) can be configured with required security services in the system. 
MTSDs (Mutually trusted service domains) act as a regulatory compliance between cloud 
providers and clients. This holds the policies and mechanisms that the provider will use to control 
the clients VMs. The information provided by the MTSDs is the key source for the virtual shield 
in our prototype model. 
All these comprise to form the client side Meta domain. 
DomB (Domain Builder) is a virtual machine provided by the cloud provider to build the guest 
virtual machines upon the request from client. 
SDom0 (System side administrative domain) administers the client virtual machines. It takes care 
of starting and stopping of the client VMs. 
 
2.3 ATTACK SURFACE AND TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS IN CLOUD 
There is a necessity to categorize the attacks in the cloud [2]. The classification of these attacks to 
different taxonomies helps to handle various security issues. Furthermore this classification 
criterion designs the attack surface for different levels in the cloud architecture. 
Cloud computing can be modeled with three different types of participants, service users, service 
instances (Virtual Machines), and the cloud provider [3]. The interactions in the cloud will be 
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between any of these two classes. Similarly the attacks in the cloud can be identified into a set of 
interactions with in these 3 classes (service users, service instances, and cloud providers). 
 
The six different kinds of attack surfaces have been identified in the cloud [2]: 
1. service-to-user    
2. user-to-service  
3 cloud-to-services  
4. service-to-cloud  
5. cloud-to-user  
6. user-to-cloud  
These attack surfaces act as a measurement of security in cloud computing. The system is said to 
be more secure if it has a smaller attack surface. 
 




An IO automation model can be used to design the attack surface of the cloud [5]. Attack surface 
reduction and code quality improvement are complementary approaches for reducing security 
risk. A smaller attack surface reduces the risk of vulnerabilities by making it harder to exploit and 
thus lowers the potential of exploitation. 
 
Figure 2.8 Attack Surface Measurements 
                                                 
2.3.1 ATTACK SURFACE METRICS 
Many attacks like exploiting a buffer overflow, symlink attacks, on a system take place because 
the system sends data into the environment. In these attacks the attacker system and the attacked 
system were connected using some channels (e.g. sockets), invoking system methods (e.g. API), 
and send data items [5]. Thus in the attack surface measurement, channels, methods and data 





2.4 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Reinforcement learning is learning what to do and how to map situations to actions to maximize 
the numerical reward. Reinforcement learning is defined not by characterizing learning methods, 
but by characterizing the learning problem [6]. 
 
2.4.1ELEMENTS OF REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Policy, a reward function, a value function, and a model of the environment are the different 
elements of reinforcement learning. 
Policy is the action to be taken based on the state of the system, a reward function is the value for 
the action taken, and a value function is the sum of all the rewards. The goal of reinforcement 
learning is to maximize the value function. The state of the system changes with respect to the 
environment. The action to be taken depends on the state and can be categorized under 
exploitation and exploration 
Exploitation is the concept of choosing the action with a high reward value. Exploitation may 
have good results at present but cannot promise better results at the end of the play. Whereas 
exploration may not provide the system with better values at the current play but may lead to 






 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this work is to design an architecture, that reduces the attack surface in self-service 
cloud computing. In addition to the components involved in SSC the new architecture will have a 
virtual shield (VS) that exists between the host virtual machine and meta domain as shown in fig 
3.1.The SSC protocol will be modified to facilitate the interaction between MTSDs and the 
virtual shield. 
 
3.2 SYSTEM BUILDING 
Bootstrapping in the new architecture is similar to the SSC model [1]. The systems in the cloud 
are assumed to be equipped with TPM (Trusted Platform Module) and IOMMU (Input Output 
Memory Management Unit) hardware. During the system boot, the BIOS pass control to the boot 
loader. The boot loader loads the modified version of xen hypervisor. The hypervisor builds the 
Sdom0, domB and the virtual shield Vs0. 
Once the Sdom0, DomB and the Vs0 are started, the Sdom0 waits for the client request. Once the 
client sends the request to Sdom0, the Sdom0 sends the request to DomB with the parameters 
send by the client. This ensures the security and privacy of the client. The DomB, then builds the 
client meta domain as in SSC. 
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The protocol used in the SSC architecture overcomes two issues as presented in the section 2.2, 
however the host virtual machine is not protected from malicious administrators and the guest 
virtual machines. 
In this work, the virtual shield protect host the virtual machine. 
 












SDom0 is the system side administrative domain. This domain controls the client virtual 
machines. The start and stop of the client virtual machines is done by SDom0. Though this 
component has the same functionalities as SDom0 in SSC, it has additional capabilities which 
don’t exist in SSC SDom0[1]. 
The SSC SDom0 has no privilege to view the state of the client virtual machines, i.e. the contents 
of virtual CPU, virtual memory etc. But in our proposed new architecture the SDom0 will be 
designed to have access if the client virtual machine is found to be malicious. The virtual shield 
provides these capabilities to SDom0 by providing the privileges to access the client virtual 
machines states. 
2. Virtual Shield 
The virtual shield is designed with different functionalities and security measurements. MSTD 
designed in the SSC are the key source of information to the virtual shield, which provides the 
information about the type of attack and the severity of the attack. In SSC the MSTD act as the 
regulatory compliance between client virtual machines and cloud providers. In SSC once the 
client virtual machines are identified to be misusing the cloud infrastructure for malicious 
activities the virtual machines are shut down and they lose its state. 
In our architecture the virtual machines are not shut down immediately. Once the MSTD identify 
the client virtual machine to be malicious, it triggers the virtual shield with the information. 
The information from the MSTD is used by the virtual shield for the reinforcement learning 
process designed to virtually configure the virtual machines to maximize security. The virtual 
shield holds a table with appropriate actions to be taken based on the state of the machine. Each 
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state has a reward value. The actions are the virtual configurations between the host virtual 
machine and the client virtual machine. Virtual shield holds one table for each virtual machine. 
3. Domain Builder 
 DomB, the domain builder builds the client side Meta domain. Once the client sends the request 
to build the virtual machines, these parameters are send to the domain builder and virtual shield. 
Domain builder uses these parameters to build the client side Meta domain. The construction of 
Meta domain is similar to SSC, whereas the MTSDs are configured to trigger the virtual shield 
when the client misuses the cloud infrastructure. 
4. Client Meta Domain  
The Client Meta domain holds UDom0, UDomU, SDs and MSTD. All these components are 
assumed to have the same functionalities as in SSC, except the MTSD. The MTSD is modified to 
trigger the virtual shield when the guest virtual machines try to perform security attacks. 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY IN VIRTUAL SHIELD 
One of the reinforcement learning methodologies will be used for the learning process in the 
virtual shield [6]. 
A Wide range of applications can be framed as reinforcement learning problems. The application 
in the virtual shield is framed to one of reinforcement learning tasks and provided with the 
method to learn. 
The aim of the reinforcement learning problem is learning from interaction to achieve a goal. The 
decision maker is called the agent. The agent interacts with the environment, that is, everything 
that is outside the agent. This is a continuous process; the agent selects the actions and the 
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environment responds to those actions and provides new situations to the agent. The environment 
also provides the numerical rewards, which the agent tries to maximize over time. A task is 
defined as a configuration change, which is one instance of the reinforcement learning problem. 
           
          Figure 3.2 The agent-environment interaction in reinforcement learning 
At discrete time steps, t=0,1,2,3,…… the agent and the environment interact with each other. At 
each step t, the agent is provided with some representation of the environment’s state St  S, 
where S is the set of possible states and St is one of the states of S. A (St) are the set of actions 
available in that state. After selecting the action A t  A (St), the agent receives a numerical 
reward, rt+1  R and enters a new state. 
At each time step, a mapping from states to probabilities of selecting each passible action is 
implemented. This mapping is called the agent’s policy ∏t, where ∏t (S,A) is the probability that 
At = A if St = S where S is State and A is Action). In reinforcement learning the agent changes its 
policies as a result of experience. The agent’s goal is to maximize the total amount of reward it 
receives over time. In our system the mutually trusted service domain is framed as the 









SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
 4.1 IMPLEMENTATION 
CloudSim [14] is used to simulate the cloud environment. Cloudsim is a simulation environment 
to simulate the cloud architectures before actual deployment. Cloudsim provides java APIs to 
design the various elements of the cloud computing architecture. The underlying architecture 
contains different subsystems. Each subsystem is designed and simulated to satisfy the 
requirements of the whole architecture. 
Different subsystems in the architecture includes 
1. SSC SUB SYSTEM 
2. MTSD SUB SYSTEM 
3. VIRTUAL SHIELD SUB SYSTEM 
4. ATTACK SYSTEM 
5. CONFIGURATION SYSTEM 




4.1.1 SSC SUB SYSTEM 
The SSC sub system is the main system which initializes the entire architecture. Upon request 
from the client, the administrative domain (Broker) in the SSC sub system requests the Data 
Center (Hypervisor) to allocate resources to the client. 
During the initialization, the other subsystems are also activated or initialized.   
The current client configuration will be written to the virtual shield. 
The mutually trusted service domain is initialized with the different attack models and 
configuration parameters, which are in turn used to detect the malicious clients. 
 
4.1.2   MUTUALLY TRUSTED SERVICE DOMAIN (MTSD) 
During the client initialization, the mutually trusted service domain is also initialized with the 
different attack models to check the client’s attacks. 
The Mutually Trusted Service Domain periodically checks the network packets transmitted to 
identify the malicious clients. During this process if the MTSD identifies that the client is 
misusing the application, it notifies the virtual shield with the attack type. This attack type is used 
to calculate the score of the current configuration. 
 
4.1.3 VIRTUAL SHIELD 
The mutually trusted service domain triggers the virtual shield periodically with the activities of 
the client. If the MTSD identifies that the client is misusing the cloud infrastructure, depending 
upon the type of attack, severity of the attack and the existing configuration, it triggers the virtual 
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shield and the virtual shield calculates the score of the existing configuration and requests the 
administrator to change the configuration of the client. 
The Virtual shield uses the simple reinforcement learning mechanism to allocate the different 
configuration parameters to the client. 
The reinforcement learning mechanism performs exploration and exploitation to allocate the 
configurations. During exploration the virtual shield selects the random configurations from the 
configuration database. Once all the allocated configurations for the client have been explored, it 
uses the exploitation mechanism to fetch the configuration which has the highest score. 
Each individual configuration is assigned a default score initially. The type of attack determines 
the calculated score for the configurations. 
 
4.1.4 CONFIGURATION SYSTEM 
Configuration defines the properties of the virtual machines such as computing capacity in terms 
of million instructions per second, image size, memory size, number of cpus, and bandwidth. The 
configuration system is a database which holds the different configuration parameters for 
different clients. It has the different configurations for different type of attacks. The virtual shield 
allocates these configurations to the clients by analyzing the existing configuration and type of 
attack the client performed. 
Different parameters in the configurations include: MIPS, IMAGE SIZE, MEMORY SIZE, 
CPUS, and BAND WIDTH.  




Image size defines the size of the operating system image. 
Memory size defines the size of the internal memory. 
CPUs define the number of cpus required by the virtual machine. 
Bandwidth defines the network bandwidth (number of bits transmitted per second). 
 
4.1.5 ATTACK SYSTEM 
The attack system is a database which holds different attacks metrics. These attack metrics are 
used by the Mutually Trusted Service Domain to identify the malicious client and notify the 
virtual shield with the type of attack and severity of the attack. There can be different metrics to 
identify the attack types. In our architecture for the purpose of simulation we used a 8 bit binary 
coded value to identify the attack type and severity of the attack. 
10000001 – First four bits of the code determines the type of attack and last four bits are used to 
determine the severity of the attack. 
Here 1000 determines the type of attack in the database and 0001 determines the severity of the 
attack.  
These metrics are used by the virtual shield along with the existing configuration score to 























The communication protocol in the above figure4.1 explains how each subsystem in the 
architecture interacts with each other. After the initialization of Sdom0, the client requests the 
system side administrative domain for the virtual machine by passing the configuration 
parameters. 
                                                COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL 
 
Client (Mips,Image Size, BW,CPUs,RAM)-----------(REQ)------------- Admin (Broker) 
 








VIRTUAL SHIELD----------(CONF CHANGE)-----------ADMIN 
 




The Dom0 requests the datacenter i.e. the Hypervisor to provide the requested resources to the 
client.In this process, the hypervisor initializes the virtual shield and clients meta domain.  
If the client tries to misuse the resources, MTSD triggers the virtual shield. The Virtual shield in 
turn calculates the scores for the current configuration based on the type of the attack and severity 
of the attack. It also changes the current configuration to another configuration which has highest 
score during exploitation. 
This architecture on which this protocol executes is shown in figure 3.3 
 
4.3 SCORE CALCULATION:  
The last four bits of the binary code in the attack system is used to calculate the score for the 
current configuration. The first four bits determines the type of attack. The value of the type of 
attack is multiplied by the value of the last four bits to generate the score to be subtracted from 





                                              
 
                                  Figure 4.2 Score Calculation 
10000001 
1000 ----------> = 8 
0001 ---------> = 2            
 
S(c) ------> Conf Score 
S(a) ----> Attack Score 
T(a) ---->  Type 
Se(a) ----> Severity 
S(N) -----> New Score  
 
S(a) = T(a) * Se(a)           
S(a) = (8*2) =16             
S(N) = S(c) - S(a)             




4.3.1 VIRTUAL MACHINE TERMINATION  
The mutually trusted service domain periodically checks the clients meta domain for attacks. 
These periodical updates are notified to the virtual shield to calculate the scores for individual 
configurations. The individual scores of the allocated configurations to the client are aggregated 
to identify the overall score of the client’s virtual machine. This aggregated score is used to 
determine the threshold for the client termination. Once the virtual shield identifies the total score 
is less the threshold designed by the cloud provider or the administrator, the client’s virtual 
machine is terminated. 
The client is notified every time the configuration changes. If the client still tries to misuse the 
cloud infrastructure, the over al score eventually decreases and finally results in the termination 
of the clients virtual machine. The threshold is defined by the cloud provider for each and every 
client virtual machine. If the overall score of the client virtual machine is less than the threshold, 
the virtual shield informs the administrator to terminate the client’s virtual machine. This process 







   n 
O(c) = ∑ Si(c) 
     i=0 
 
                                      If O(c) < T(c) 
                                      Terminate 
O(c) ---->Client Score 
T(c) ----->Threshold 
Si(c) ----->Scores of individual configurations 
n -------->number of configurations  
  
              Figure 4.3 Terminating Condition 





Table 4.1 Attacks Information 
We assumed six different types of attacks by the client’s virtual machine. 
Denial of Service:  
Denial of service or Distributed denial of service attack is an attempt to make a machine or 
network unavailable to the intended users. In our architecture this type of attack can be performed 
my clients virtual machine by sending multiple requests to the hypervisor and thereby consuming 
more resources [10]. 
VM Escape: 
 Security between the Host and VM is another area which introduces a threat called VM escape 
[9]. There are different zones in the cloud and even if a single VM is attacked it poses a threat to 
the whole system. If a malicious user can get access to a VM then he can directly communicate 
with the Hypervisor and can get complete access to all the VM’s. 
Inter VM attacks: 






Denial Of Service    VERY HIGH 10001111 1111 
VM Escape        HIGH 01000011 0011 
Inter-VM Attacks        HIGH 00100011 0011 
Communication Attacks       MODERATE 00010001 0001 
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Inter VM attacks refer to attacks launched from one virtual machine to another co-residing virtual 
machine directly, typically by bypassing the virtual machine monitor (VMM) [13]. 
Communication attacks: 
These are attacks launched by the virtual machines on the network channel. Routers and switches 
may be compromised due to communication attacks 
                      REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR VIRTUAL SHIELD 
 
                                                                                                 EXPLORATION 
 
Virtual Shield (Exp)                 
If Exp==0                                   
    Generate Random Number 
    Choose Configuration State 
    Set Current State = Configuration State (Random Number) 
    Configuration State. Remove (Random Number) 
     If (Configuration State is Empty ()) 
         Exp=1; 
 
 
                                                                                                   EXPLOITATION                  
Else                                            
          Get Score (State Zero) 
          Set B to 0 
          For All States in Virtual Shield 
                  Set Y to X 
                   Set X to MAXIMUM of X, Get Score (B) 
                   If (X! = Y) 
                  Set new State to Virtual Shield. State (B). 
                  Increment B 
             
                                                                                               SCORE GENERATION 
Generate Scores ()     
If Attack= True 
Current State. Score= Current State. Score -ErrorCodeScore; 
Change Configurations  
Else  






CloudSim [14] was used to simulate the entire environment. Cloudsim provides java APIs to 
design the various elements of the cloud computing architecture. We defined three different 
classes for this simulation. 
1. CLIENT CLASS 
2. MSTD CLASS 
3. VIRTUAL SHIELD CLASS 
These classes are explained as the subsystems in section 4.1 
The following graph determines how secure the client virtual machine is. Once the client virtual 
machines score reaches below the threshold, the virtual machine is terminated. 
      
 
                                                                              TIME IN MINUTES                       









                                                Table 4.2 Configuration Scores  
 
Table 4.2 explains the change in configuration for every minute. This can be observed from the 
table that if the client virtual machine tries to attack the total configuration score of that client 




The above graph shows the activity of the client. It can be observed that at the 22nd minute the 
total configuration score is less than the threshold which results in termination of the virtual 
machine.  
As we can observe from the table 4.2, the score increases till the 3rd minute and decreases at 4th 
minute. This indicates that the cloud infrastructure is misused or the client is malicious. The 
gradual decrease in the score can be observed from 9th to 16th minute, this indicates that the client 
is malicious. Similarly from the 16th minute till 18th minute the score increase, this indicates that 































Self-service cloud computing reduces the attack surface of the traditional cloud architecture by 
transferring most of the privileges to the clients Meta domain. However this architecture is not 
designed to protect the inter virtual machine attacks and clients vm attacks on the administrative 
domain and hypervisor. 
In the proposed architecture (SSC with Virtual Shield), the client side attacks have been mitigated 
by dynamically configuring the virtual machines based on the type and severity of the attacks 
performed by the clients. 
SSC with virtual shield is a new computing model designed to protect the host virtual machine 
from various attacks by the guest virtual machines. The proposed new design has the capability to 
shift the privileges between the system side administrative domain and client side administrative 
domain. This dynamic configuration of virtual machines reduces the attack surface and makes the 
cloud more secure. 
A simple reinforcement learning algorithm has been used to calculate the scores and 
configuration changes. This algorithm uses exploitation and exploration to perform this operation. 
If the client tries to misuse the cloud infrastructure, the configuration changes according to the 
information present in the configuration subsystem. The simulation and results section explains 
the configuration changes and virtual shield termination.  
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In the proposed architecture, the reinforcement learning algorithm has been used to make the 
virtual shield learn from the environment. This algorithm holds good for a minimum number of 
client virtual machines, since a single virtual shield runs this algorithm to calculate the scores. 
The overhead on the virtual shield increases to handle multiple clients and multiple virtual 
machines. Moreover if the virtual shield fails, there is no way to protect the entire system from 
the attacks of the client. The virtual shield can fail because of hardware problem or may be due to 
the extra over head in handling multiple virtual machines. 
The proposed architecture can be enhanced by removing the single point of failure by having a 
backup virtual shield called a Stand-by Virtual Shield which performs backup tasks by 
snapshotting. Snapshotting is the process of identifying the virtual machines state and securely 
storing the states in external devices.  If the active Virtual Shield fails, the stand-by virtual shield 
can be made active. Multiple clients can be simultaneously handled by introducing the concept of 
multiple VM clusters in the virtual shield. Multiple virtual machines are associated with single 
virtual shield.  This works by replacing the reinforcement learning algorithm with map and 
reduce functions running on the cluster of VM’s. This removes the overhead on the system and 
can provide more accurate results by analyzing the system log files for different kind of attacks. 
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